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GUERILLAS IN THE MIDST: THE DANGERS OF
UNCHECKED POLICE POWERS THROUGH THE
USE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT CHECKPOINTS

Freedom is not something that can be achieved once and for all
time. It is a continuing process that survives only as it is lived and practiced. In this sense, freedom is an objective that can never be won. It can
only be lost. - Clifford Case, former U.S. Senator from New Jersey
I. INTRODUCTION
Passing through obligatory checkpoints at airports and international
borders, in schools, courthouses and government offices, has become a
familiar, if occasionally irritating, ritual to Americans. For more than
twenty-five years, law enforcement has used checkpoints in an effort to
detect illegal aliens.' The uses for checkpoints have expanded to include
the prevention of drunk driving, operation of unsafe or stolen vehicles,
operation of vehicles by unlicensed drivers, and most recently, the prevention of drug trafficking and apprehension of drug dealers.2
See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 553 (1976) (noting use of inland checkpoints to detect illegal aliens as early as 1973).
2 See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990) (upholding
constitutionality of state's use of sobriety checkpoints); Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d
659, 666 (7th Cir. 1999) (suggesting constitutionality of drug checkpoint if government
proved drug dealing in area at "epidemic proportions"), affd sub nom. City of Indianapolis
v. Edmond, 121 S.Ct. 447 (2000); Brouhard v. Lee, 125 F.3d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 1997)
(upholding sobriety checkpoint where all vehicles passing through stopped by officers);
Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1550-51 (1Ith Cir. 1995) (finding drug checkpoint constitutional because also intended as drivers' license checkpoint); United States v. Dillon,
983 F. Supp. 1037, 1040 (D.Kan. 1997) (concluding sobriety and auto inspection checkpoint at military base constitutional); United States v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306, 1307
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding traffic enforcement checkpoint constitutional despite "spin-off"
effect of deterring drug dealing); see also Utah v. DeBooy, 996 P.2d 546, 554 (2000) (in-
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Troubled by the menacing presence of crime in their neighborhoods, citizens are rallying to the cries of politicians for a return to "law
and order."-3 Many citizens proclaim their willingness to sacrifice some of
their personal freedoms in exchange for a greater sense of security and
insulation from criminal behavior.4 With the seeming omnipresence of
drugs in this country, law enforcement officials in many states have added
narcotics checkpoints to their drug-fighting arsenal.5 Yet, by definition,
such checkpoints not only permit brief seizures of individuals and their
vehicles without even reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed or is committing a crime, but also directly further the goals of general criminal law enforcement. 6
While acknowledging the pervasiveness and seriousness of the
dangers that drug trafficking poses, courts in a number of states have
deemed narcotics checkpoints unconstitutional.7 Nevertheless, several of
these same courts have acknowledged that, under certain circumstances,
narcotics checkpoints might be reasonable. 8 The United States Supreme
validating multi-purpose vehicle checkpoint); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 2000 WL
29492, at *6 (Mass. Jan. 18, 2000) (holding checkpoints to apprehend drugs or other contraband violate state constitution); Missouri v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Mo. 1996)
(upholding constitutionality of drug checkpoints); Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990,
999 (D.C. App. Ct. 1991) (deeming checkpoint constitutional if primary purpose to check
for licenses not drugs).
3See Charles W. Colson, Truth, Justice and Peace: The Foundationsof Restorative
Justice, 10 REGENT U.L. REV. 1, 1 (Spring 1998) (observing citizens' approval of tough
approach to fighting drugs).
4 See id. The author cites a survey by the Miami Heraldin which seventy percent of
respondents stated they would support roadblocks and random searches of vehicles by
police to help combat the presence of drugs in their neighborhoods. Id.
5 See Scott A. White, The Constitutionality of Drug Enforcement Checkpoints in
Missouri, 63 Mo. L. REV. 263, 263 (Winter 1998) (commenting on greater use of drug
enforcement checkpoints).
6 See Galberth, 590 A.2d at 997-98 (observing stops to detect drug-related crimes
fall in category of general law enforcement).
7 See id. at 999 (pronouncing drug checkpoint unconstitutional due to lack of "empirical evidence" of its effectiveness); Edmond, 183 F.3d at 666; see also United States v.
Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547, 559 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding checkpoint unconstitutional despite
"important governmental interest" of stopping drug dealing); United States v. MoralesZamora, 974 F.2d 149, 153 (10th Cir. 1992) (declaring drug checkpoint with ostensible
purpose of auto inspection pretextual and unconstitutional); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 509
S.E.2d 540, 543 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (deeming checkpoint designed to halt trespassers and
drug dealers at apartment complex unconstitutional).
8See Edmond, 183 F.3d at 666 (contending drug checkpoint could fall under "special
needs" exception to individualized suspicion requirement for seizures); Huguenin, 154 F.3d
at 563 (implying, with proper safeguards and no pretext, checkpoints for drunk driving and
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Court recently addressed the issue of narcotics checkpoints in the case of
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond.9 Although the Court invalidated the
checkpoint program involved, it left open the possibility of law enforcement officials operating checkpoints with a secondary purpose of intercepting drugs. 10

This note examines the reasoning behind courts' decisions to either
uphold or invalidate checkpoints possessing either a stated or underlying
purpose of apprehending drug dealers. It begins by evaluating the test
courts uniformly apply when deciding the issue of the reasonableness of a
search or seizure in various contexts." Specifically, the note focuses on
searches and seizures of vehicles and motorists stopped at checkpoints
where individualized suspicion
is not a prerequisite for officers to have the
12
authority to stop drivers.
In addition, the note traces the history of decisions involving
searches and seizures of automobiles and their occupants, and the evolution of constitutional interpretations of the Fourth Amendment with regard
to reasonableness.' 3 It examines the contexts within which the United
States Supreme Court has ruled that neither probable cause nor a warrant is
necessary to effectuate the seizure of an automobile. This note also presents the Court's reasoning in dispensing with the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion in the context of automobile seizures at checkpoints.
Lastly, the note uses judicial rationales and opinions to analyze
the
reasons why authorizing the use of law enforcement checkpoints poses an
insidious threat to the freedoms of every individual in this country by
opening further the ever-widening door of unlimited, unconstrained police
powers. 14
II. THE HISTORY OF CHECKPOINTS
Mandatory stops at roadblocks constitute seizures subject to Fourth
Amendment limitations.' 5 In 1976, the Supreme Court dispensed with the
drugs constitutional).
' 121 S.Ct. 447 (2000).
"0 See Edmond, 121 S.Ct. at
457 n.2.
" See infra Part LII.A-C.
12See infra notes 32-46.
13See infra Part 1I.
14See infra Part IV.
15

See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556 (stating checkpoints fall within Fourth

Amendment's scope).

JOURNAL OF TRIAL &APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. VI

requirement of reasonable suspicion for the brief stopping of individual
motorists at checkpoints designed to uncover illegal aliens. 16 Noting the
impracticability of requiring reasonable, or indeed, any measure of suspicion while still being able to successfully ferret out the large number of
illegal aliens on public highways, the Court employed a balancing test. 17
The Court ultimately deemed the government's interest in keeping illegal
aliens out of the country greater than the temporary and rather minor
intru18
privacy.
of
freedom
and
movement
of
freedom
sion on motorists'
Three years later, the Court distinguished random stops of automobiles from checkpoint stops and held that police may not arbitrarily, without reasonable suspicion, stop vehicles to question the drivers.1 9 Nevertheless, in situations where individualized suspicion is "dispensable," the
government must employ safeguards to effectively constrain law enforcement officers' discretion to protect individuals from police abuse. 20 Later
See id. at 567. The Court went even further, maintaining that officers could hold
drivers for more extensive questioning if the officers had some suspicion the car held illegal aliens, even if the only basis for that suspicion were that an occupant of the car looked
Mexican or of Mexican descent. Id. at 563.
17 See id. at 557. The Court weighed the governmental need
to stop illegal aliens
from entering the country against the intrusion the stop posed to those lawfully in the
stopped vehicle. Id. at 567. The Border Patrol set up the roadblocks at issue, some permanent, and some temporary, on major roads leading away from the border. Id. at 552. One
checkpoint was sixty-six miles from the border. Id. at 545. In 1973, the combination of
temporary and permanent checkpoints, along with "roving patrols," caught over 55,000
illegal aliens. Id. at 553. The majority of these were at checkpoints. Id.
s See id. at 567. "The principal protection of 4th Amendment rights at checkpoints
16

lies in appropriate limitations on the scope of the stop." Id. at 566-67. The view of the
Court in Martinez-Fuertestands in stark contrast to the view the Court expressed fifty years
earlier in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In Carroll, the Court created the
so-called "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement when police conduct a search
or seizure. Id. at 153-54. The Court held that the warrantless search and seizure of an
automobile where probable cause exists is a valid exercise of government authority. Id.
Acknowledging the need to stop people entering the country to have those entering prove
their right to be here, the Court continued:
But those lawfully within the Country, entitled to use the public highways,
have a right to free passage without interruption or search, unless there is
known to be a competent official, authorized to search, probable cause for
believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise. Id. at 149.
19 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1986) (holding random, suspicionless
stops unreasonable when reasonable alternative means available). The Court went on to
add that its decision did not preclude states from devising programs for "spot checks" of all
vehicles because they would be less invasive to individuals' rights as long as they gave the
officers conducting the checks less discretion. Id. at 663.
20 See id. at 654-55 (recognizing dangers of unfettered police discretion).
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that same year, the Court announced a three-prong test for determining
when a search or seizure conducted without probable cause, a warrant, or
reasonable suspicion is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.2 1
These decisions paved the way for state and local authorities to
create checkpoint programs designed to combat an array of societal
woes. 22
Many of these programs were quickly subject to court
23
challenges. In Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz,24 the United States
Supreme Court undertook the issue of whether highway roadblocks established to deter drunk driving violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments' proscriptions against unreasonable searches and seizures.2 5 While
upholding the constitutionality of the preliminary stop of vehicles at such
roadblocks, the Court conceded that a subsequent demand for a driver to
submit to field sobriety tests might require some degree of suspicion by the
officer that the individual was intoxicated.26 Although the appellants
urged the Court to consider other less intrusive means the state might employ to promote the same goals, the Court responded that the determination of whether a different plan posing less of an encroachment on individual privacy is not within the purview of the courts.2 7
During its most recent term, the United States Supreme Court surprised many Court watchers when it ruled that a checkpoint program
whose primary purpose was to uncover illegal drugs violated the Fourth
Amendment.28 Despite acknowledging the gravity of the drug problem,
21 See

infra Part M. See also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).

"Consid-

eration of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing of the gravity of the
public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public
interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty." Id.
22 See, e.g., Norwood v. Bain, 166 F.3d 243, 247 (4th Cir. 1999) (upholding weapons
checkpoint at motorcycle rally); Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1551 (validating checkpoint for drug
detection and checking licenses and registrations); Wilson, 509 S.E.2d at 540 (involving
checkpoint to keep trespassers and drugs out of private apartment complex).
23 See id. (referring to similar cases in other jurisdictions).
24 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
25 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 447 (declaring roadblocks subject to constitutional scrutiny).
26 See id. at 450 (looking only at constitutionality of initial stop).
27

See id. at 453-54 (rejecting use of "less intrusive alternative" theory when deter-

mining checkpoint's constitutionality); see also Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557 n.12
("[E]laborate less restrictive alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the
exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers."); Brouhard, 125 F.3d at 660 (agreeing
court has no duty to inquire if less intrusive means to halt drunk driving available). But see
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659 (considering alternative means already in place and
others possible in holding suspicionless random vehicle stops unconstitutional).
28
EdMond, 121 S.Ct. at 451.
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the Court maintained that it had never sanctioned any
checkpoint designed
29
to find evidence of "ordinary criminal wrongdoing.
III. ANALYZING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CHECKPOINTS
The United States Supreme Court has emphasized the need for government officials charged with overseeing checkpoint programs to formulate formal guidelines for these programs. 30 The guidelines must sufficiently restrict the actions of the officers who conduct the checkpoints,
otherwise courts may invalidate the program because it makes the potential
for police abuse too likely. 31 Additionally, in determining whether checkpoint seizures and searches are reasonable, courts must consider factors
such as where police set up the checkpoints and the manner in which the
police run them.32 Courts have consistently applied the Brown33 test when
analyzing the validity of checkpoint programs.34
The factors under the Brown test are the following: 1) the importance of the governmental interest in the goal of the checkpoint; 2) the
effectiveness of the checkpoint in furthering that governmental interest;
and 3) the degree of intrusiveness the checkpoint causes the individual.35
If the first two factors together outweigh the last, then the court will uphold the checkpoint as a constitutional exercise of governmental
authority. 36

29 Id.
30

at 454.

See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453 (approving use of guidelines for establishing check-

points); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 565 (requiring routine "method of operation" for
checkpoint).
31 See Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 559 (asserting need for non-field law enforcement officer deciding on operational details of checkpoint).
32 Id. at 565 (opining "[t]he reasonableness of checkpoint stops, however, turns on
factors such as the location and method of operation, ... factors that are not susceptible to
the distortion of hindsight").
13 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (enumerating factors courts must consider in determining constitutionality of checkpoints).
See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449-50 (confirming Brown as correct test for deciding constitutionality of seizures not amounting to actual arrest).
35Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51.
36 Id.
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A. Importance of the governmental interest

Under the Brown test, courts first consider the importance of the
governmental interest in achieving its expressed goal. 37 There is little disagreement that the government has a very strong interest in promoting and
maintaining safety on the roads. 38 Disagreement arises, however, when the
government's purported interest does not coincide with the actual or primary purpose of the checkpoint. 39 Some courts have held checkpoint programs invalid if the government misrepresented the true purpose of the
program. 4° Other courts look solely at the governmental interest or interests that1 operation of the checkpoint is in fact promoting, however mini4
mally.

Whereas public safety ranks high as a valid purpose, some courts
have expressly forbidden the use of checkpoints as a means to further general law enforcement practices; namely, to apprehend criminals and/or
contraband.42 A roadblock aimed at combating drug trafficking is, by
definition, operated to catch criminals and contraband. 43 Yet drug trafficking has attained monstrous proportions that make the interest to the
37Id
38

See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658 (acknowledging legitimacy of states' serious concern

with keeping unfit drivers and autos off road).
39Compare Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 555 (invalidating checkpoint with alleged road
safety purpose and real purpose of catching drug dealers) and Morales-Zamora,974 F.2d at
153 (labeling stop with main purpose not to check licenses but to look for drugs "pretextual") with Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1551 (authorizing checkpoint with primary purpose to stop
drug dealing and secondary purpose of ensuring licensing of drivers).
40See Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 554 (opining "a pretextual roadblock has pitfalls that
come perilously close to permitting unfettered government intrusion on the privacy interests of all motorists"). The government maintained that the challenged roadblock was
designed to get drunk drivers off the public roads to make them safer. Id. at 550. Yet a
drug-sniffing canine was always at the site while there was never any breathalyzer. Id. Any
items which the police discovered as evidence of drug dealing could be permanently seized.
Id. While officers arrested seven for driving under the influence during the two months the
checkpoint operated, they arrested 128 people for drug crimes. Id. at 555-56.
41See Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1551 n.2 (contending use of pretextual purpose of check-

point irrelevant in evaluating checkpoint's validity).
42 See Galberth, 590 A.2d at 998-99 (holding roadblock used to catch criminals and
evidence unconstitutional); Park v. Forest Service of the U.S., 1999 WL 692345, at *9
(W.D. Mo. Jun 11, 1999) (repudiating checkpoint designed to promote general law enforcement).
43See Edmond, 183 F.3d at 662 (observing reasonableness to search without suspicion allowed for "special needs," not enforcement of criminal laws). The city did not argue
that it was actually looking to apprehend drug dealers rather than seeking to ensure public
safety on the roads. Id. at 664.
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government in halting it absolutely critical. 44 In Sitz, the Supreme Court
permitted sobriety checkpoints, which would, by their nature, further general law enforcement goals because those goals were incidental, or at least
secondary, to a goal of public safety.45
B. Effectiveness of the checkpoint in furtheringthe governmental interest
In order for a checkpoint to pass the "effectiveness" prong, the
checkpoint need not represent the best or even the only means by which to
achieve the government's goal. 46 In terms of the effectiveness of a program, although there is no pre-determined, quantitative measure below
which courts will automatically invalidate a checkpoint program, the
United States Supreme Court has set an extremely low threshold. 47 Despite the low percentage of programs the Supreme Court has approved,
some lower courts have found that programs with higher "hit" rates - usually measured by the number of arrests made and citations issued compared to the total number of vehicles stopped - do not necessarily pass
constitutional muster. 48 Likewise, the courts are split on whether to include in their effectiveness calculations all of the arrests and tickets at the
checkpoint when the nature of some of the charges differs from the stated
purpose of the checkpoint. 49
See Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 559 (acknowledging war on drugs important governmental interest); Damask, 936 S.W.3d at 571 (finding drug crisis in U.S.).
45 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451 (focusing on grave harm drunk drivers cause).
46 See Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 571 (stating "it is not for the courts to
decide 'as to
44

which among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed .... ')
(quoting Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453).
47 See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455 (upholding sobriety checkpoint where 1.6%
of stopped
drivers arrested for driving under influence); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 554 (noting
146,000 autos stopped over eight days and 171 found to contain illegal aliens). Curiously,
although the Court repeatedly mentions that of the 820 cars instructed to pull over for a
further search, 171, or twenty percent of them, yielded illegal aliens, the Court does not
translate the numbers at the original stop, which show that the overall "hit" rate of the
checkpoint was just over one-tenth of one percent. Id.
48 See Edmond, 183 F.3d at 666 (declaring high
hit rate not enough to justify narcotics roadblocks without more evidence of drug problem). Of the 1,161 vehicles stopped,
five percent of them concluded in drug arrests and overall, including arrests for offenses
such as driving with an expired license, nine percent ended in arrests. Id. at 661.
49 See Wilson, 509 S.E.2d at 543 (remarking state presented no evidence any
arrests
at drug checkpoint for drug offenses). Police arrested the defendant for drunk driving at the
checkpoint, which police had set up outside an apartment complex after residents complained of pervasive drug dealing on the premises. Id. at 541. See also Park, 1999 WL
692345, at *9 (dismissing statistics government touted for purported sobriety checkpoint).
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Where the supposed purpose of the checkpoint does not coincide
with the actual purpose, courts may disregard any arrests or citations for
the falsely alleged purpose.5 ° Some courts have found that the primary
purpose of a checkpoint is different from the stated purpose, basing their
finding on the nature of the offenses committed by the greatest number of
motorists apprehended at the checkpoint. 1 When no data is available to
measure and test effectiveness, then the court may speculate as to the expected rate of success.52
Courts may also consider the number of law enforcement officials
assigned to a roadblock in determining effectiveness, based on a mostefficient-allocation-of-resources theory. 53 Still, such determinations invariably cannot take into account just how great a deterrent effect the
The court stated that in order to measure effectiveness of the so-called sobriety checkpoint,
one should look at the number of arrests for drunk driving, not the number of people without valid licenses or registrations. Id.
50 See Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 553-54 (advocating effectiveness measured only as to
true purpose of checkpoint). Police operated the checkpoint over sixty-four different days
and stopped more than 2,300 autos. Id. at 556. They made only seven drunk driving arrests, yet 128 arrests for crimes involving drugs. Id. Using only the former figure, the court
found that this translated to a .29% apprehension rate, which the court concluded was too
low. Id. at 559. The court refused to find any significance in the fact that this percentage
was more than double that in Martinez-Fuerte,which the Supreme Court had upheld. Id. at
559 n.1 1. The court excoriated the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Merrett v. Moore, which
held that a narcotics checkpoint was effective based on the percentage of drivers who received tickets for driving without a valid license or registration. Id. at 553-54.
In Merrett, the roadblock had about 2,100 autos drive through over two days.
Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1549. Highway officers stopped 1,330 of the autos. Id. In addition,
trained dogs sniffed the vehicles passing through, as well as some vehicles in a nearby rest
area. Id. The dogs indicated that twenty-eight of the vehicles might contain drugs, yet
officers arrested only one individual for drug possession after more thorough searches. Id.
The officers also handed out sixty-one tickets. Id.
" See McFayden, 865 F.2d at 1312 (finding main goal of roadblock to control traffic). The court accepted the government's assertion that 3% of stopped drivers had violated
a traffic or criminal law, justifying arrest. Id. at 1313. According to the government, onehalf percent of stopped drivers had committed or were committing a crime. Id. The court
then compared the percentages with those in Martinez-Fuerte and concluded that because
the percentages before them were higher, that the roadblocks at issue were sufficiently
effective. Id.
52 See Prouse,440 U.S. at 659-60 (projecting expected effectiveness of random traffic stops to catch unlicensed drivers very low). Working without any empirical data, the
Court mused there are very few unlicensed drivers on the roads, so on average, the police
would likely have to stop a lot of vehicles in order to catch just one unlicensed driver. Id. at
660.
53 See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 460 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (speculating on how many arrests nineteen officers involved in checkpoint might have made if on regular patrol).
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checkpoint has with regard to the targeted behavior.54
C. Degree of intrusiveness of the checkpoint on the individual
In Sitz, the Supreme Court concluded the overall intrusiveness of
properly run drunk driving checkpoints was slight.55 Unlike sobriety
checkpoints, narcotics checkpoints typically have a trained, drug-sniffing
dog on hand.56 In United States v. Place,5 7 the Supreme Court ruled that a
trained dog sniffing the exterior of luggage did not constitute a search requiring Fourth Amendment scrutiny. 58 The Court supported its conclusion
by observing that the defendant's luggage was in a public place and the
dog only had access to the outside of the bags.59 Courts have applied this
holding to other types of property subject to dog sniffs, implying that use
of a trained canine poses no greater intrusion to the occupant of a car than
the owner of a suitcase. 6°
1. Objective intrusion
To assess the objective intrusion of each checkpoint, courts consider how long the stop lasts, the nature of the search, and, specifically, the
questioning involved.61 While the Supreme Court has set no outer limit on
how long a government officer may lawfully detain an individual, whether
with or without reasonable suspicion, it has said that such detention may
not be protracted. 62 The duration of a stop may be only a few minutes, but
54

See Galberth, 590 A.2d at 990 (finding no quantitative evidence roadblock suc-

cessful for reason other than presence of so many officers).
55 See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452 (labeling length and degree of investigation "minimal").
56 See, e.g., Edmond, 183 F.3d at 661 (leading drug dog around car during stop); Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 551 (using drug dog only if reasonable suspicion car contains drugs);
Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1549; Morales-Zamora,974 F.2d at 149.
57 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
58 Id. at 707.
59 Id.
60 See Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1553 (analogizing dog sniff of exterior of car to dog sniff

of exterior of suitcase). The court cited Place, calling the sniff "minimally intrusive" and
pointed out that the cars had been in a public place. Id.
61 See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451 (declaring duration and scope of search yardsticks for
measuring objective intrusion).
62 See Place, 462 U.S. at 709-10 (referring to Terry stops, when reasonable suspicion
exists).
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depending on the purpose of the checkpoint, that time may be too long.63
Law enforcement officials should limit the on-site officers' questions to those that will assist the officers in achieving the articulated purpose and no more. 64 In addition, law enforcement should station checkpoints in locations where traffic backups and accidents are unlikely to result.65 If backups occur, the guidelines should provide a means by which
to clear them up, such as waving vehicles through. 66 Whether the time
spent waiting to pass through the roadblock constitutes a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment depends on whether drivers reasonably think that they
may not exit the checkpoint line with impunity.6 7
2. Subjective intrusion
The extent of the subjective intrusion resulting from a checkpoint
depends upon the fear, surprise, and irritation the stop creates in the seized

motorist. 68 According to the Supreme Court, checkpoint stops should engender neither fright nor annoyance in law-abiding citizens because the
stop is brief, controlled by guidelines, and only a threat to those who have
committed, or are committing, a crime. 69 The Court insists that check63 See Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 559 (deciding stop of "at least several minutes"
far
longer than needed to determine if driver intoxicated). The court compared the twentyfive-second long average stops upheld in Sitz with the several minutes here, where both
cases addressed checkpoints ostensibly serving the same purpose. Id. at 560. See also
Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 574 (suggesting two-minute stop to check license and registration
reasonable); Brouhard, 125 F.3d at 660 (labeling objective intrusion slight where stops
under thirty seconds and questions confined to seeking signs of drunkenness).
64 See id. (limiting scope of questioning to checkpoint purpose); see also Huguenin,
154 F.3d at 558 (concluding objective intrusion unreasonable where questions asked unrelated to determination of drunkenness).
65 See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559; Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 567 (approving

checkpoint's operation to keep traffic backups to minimum).
66 See Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1551-52 (emphasizing ease with which police officers can
clear up checkpoint traffic jams).
67 See id. at 1552. The Eleventh Circuit found no evidence that many or even any of
the drivers delayed by the checkpoint felt bound to wait in line and pass through the checkpoint. Id. Yet officers ordered one driver to remain in line for the twenty minutes it took
him to get to the front. Id. at 1549. The court admitted that this seizure may have violated
the driver's constitutional rights. Id. at 1552. At times, the checkpoint traffic was backed up
for thirty to forty-five minutes. Id. at 1549.
68 See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452-53 (defining measure of subjective intrusion as "fright,
surprise and annoyance" of stopped motorist).
69 See id. at 452; see also Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 560 (reasoning "stops should
not be frightening or offensive because of their public and relatively routine nature").

JOURNAL OF TRIAL &APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. VI

points that operate pursuant to well-delineated standard procedures reassure the public of both the propriety and usefulness of such programs in
protecting the public.7 ° Oversight by officials who do not participate in the
actual running of the checkpoint but who are accountable for its operation
helps ensure it operates fairly and efficiently. 7' Guidelines require officers
to stop every vehicle or every other vehicle, thus preventing officers from
choosing which vehicles to stop based on impermissible criteria.72 Failure
of field officers to adhere to procedure can result in an objectionably high
measure of subjective intrusion.73 Nonetheless, officers may 74have some
latitude in terms of what questions they ask a detained motorist.
By omission, the Supreme Court intimates that motorists need not
receive any prior notice of a checkpoint for the program to avoid causing
any undue surprise or fear.75 Nor has advance notice of a checkpoint or
other police practice ever comprised a required part of application of the
Brown test.76 Regardless, notice, both in terms of advance publicity and
actual signs posted along the road, constitutes one fact courts often take
into account when measuring the degree of interference with a person's
rights.77 Even the sight of officers in uniform, orange traffic cones and
70

See Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 559 (pronouncing use of set guidelines likely to

instill public confidence in checkpoint program).
7, See id. (stressing need for program designers to oversee police officers' adherence
to guidelines).
72 See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453 (noting all drivers stopped and briefly questioned);
Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 546 (mentioning officers stopped and visually inspected all
vehicles); Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 561 (criticizing absence of signs to assure drivers all
vehicles subject to stop); Brouhard, 125 F.3d at 660 (approving conditions of checkpoints
showing approaching drivers all required to stop).
73 See Brown, 443 U.S. at 51 (concluding "the seizure must be carried out pursuant to
a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers"); Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 575 (approving officers' compliance with guidelines).
74 See Brouhard, 125 F.3d at 660 (holding it unreasonable to limit officers to "a
rigid, scripted series of questions"). But see Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 574-75 (sanctioning
use of checkpoint guidelines including what questions officers could pose).
75 See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452-53. In its discussion of subjective intrusion, a remark that
a checkpoint set up so that an approaching driver can see all the cars ahead being stopped
and the roadblock itself allay fears, is the nearest mention to notice the Court makes. Id. at
453.
76 See Dillon, 983 F. Supp. at 1039. "While advance publicity may be one effective
measure to protect the rights of the individual, it is not an absolute requirement when...
guidelines provide sufficient safeguards for constitutional purposes." Id. But see Galberth,
590 A.2d at 1001 (finding satisfaction of notice requirement where news conferences held
and signs on road posted).
77 See McFayden, 865 F.2d at 1313 (referring to news conference announcing checkpoint and flares at site as notice thereof); Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 574 (advocating some
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marked police cars may constitute a form of notice, albeit last-minute.7 8
A checkpoint in a relatively isolated location may intensify an individual's unease, especially when signs warning of the upcoming roadblock
mislead drivers into believing it lies straight ahead, rather than off of the
next exit. 79 Conversely, some courts have endorsed the use of such pretext
to lure drivers into unwittingly entering a checkpoint, even though the ruse
increases a driver's fear.8 °
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION AGAINST ALCOHOL
AND NARCOTICS CHECKPOINTS
Neither law enforcement officials nor courts can properly justify
suspicionless checkpoints based on expediency, even when the government has a well-founded interest. 81 The Fourth Amendment serves to keep
the government out of people's private lives. 82 Individuals do not shed
83
their privacy rights upon entering a vehicle that is on the public roads.
advance notice of checkpoints).
78

$

See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453 (remarking on presence of officers in uniform); McFay-

den, 865 F.2d at 1313 (reporting flares, police car and uniformed officers at checkpoint).
79 See Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 561 (finding checkpoint locations purposely designed
to heighten surprise). The Sheriffs Department posted signs along the highway advising
drivers of a drug/sobriety checkpoint ahead, when in fact the checkpoint was at the end of
the next exit ramp after the signs. Id. at 549. The ramp curved, obscuring any view of the
checkpoint until a driver was almost at it. Id. There were no gas stations, convenience
stores or restaurants off the ramp. Id. The court labeled the checkpoint a "trap" aimed at
drivers who had chosen to steer clear of the checkpoint "for whatever reason." Id. at 561.
80 See Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 575 (approving use of pretext as to location of checkpoint). The Missouri Supreme Court found the signs on the highway suggesting the checkpoint was a mile ahead when it was, in fact, at the bottom of the next exit ramp, were a
useful means to get drug traffickers to enter the checkpoint. Id. The court concluded the
sign ruse would make it more likely that drug traffickers would take the exit in the belief
that they could thereby bypass the checkpoint. Id.
81See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 458 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "That stopping every car might
make it easier to prevent drunk driving. .. is an insufficient justification for abandoning the
requirement of individualized suspicion." Id.
82 See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 307, 354 (Spring 1994) (calling Fourth
Amendment "gatekeeper that keeps out the government").
83 See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662 (labeling individuals' privacy expectations when in
automobile reasonable); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1967) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (underscoring Framers' intent to make privacy fundamental right).
According to Justice Brandeis, the drafters of the Constitution:
Conferred as against the government, the right to be let
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For many Americans a car serves as not only the primary means of transportation, but as an indispensable means as well.84 Exposing occupants of
a vehicle to even a brief detention by a police officer, when the officer
possesses no reason to suspect the occupants of any crime, is an unnerving
experience, even for the innocent. 85 The safety risk that the government is
trying to extinguish must be so substantial as to amount to a "special
need. '86 The belief that a safety risk exists must have a rational basis and
cannot be wholly speculative. 87 Furthermore, to qualify as a special need,
the risk must involve "an immediate or particularly serious risk to the public. ' '88 Drunk driving poses a very serious risk to the public, but that risk is
too widespread, too nebulous in terms of identifying its source, to justify
stopping every car on a particular road. 89 Considering the small percentage of the population who traffic in drugs, the same difficulty applies to
drug enforcement checkpoints. 90
Courts need to look at the availability and feasibility of other, less
meddlesome methods to accomplish a goal, even when the goal of the
government's program is undeniably compelling. 91 The need to protect
individuals' liberty interests exceeds courts' interests in limiting the scope
of their own analyses.92 In Justice Stevens' dissent in Sitz, he observed
that a police officer, parked at the checkpoint location, could likely have
caught some, if not many, of the drunk drivers that the checkpoint did,
simply by watching their driving. 93 In contrast, in Martinez-Fuerte the
alone, the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
government upon privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 478.
84See id. (referring to individuals' increasing reliance on automobiles to tend to daily
needs).
85 See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Even law-abiding
citizens may
have justifiable fear of dealing with the police." Id. at 464.
86 See Norwood, 166 F.3d at 247 (stating requirement of probable cause or reasonable suspicion only abrogated in limited circumstances).
87 See id. (finding weapons checkpoint at motorcycle rally constitutional where
rival
gangs with history of violence attended).
88 Rodriguez, 2000 WL 29492, at *2.
89 See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 458-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (rejecting majority's approval of dispensing with individualized suspicion at drunk driving checkpoints).

90 See id. at 462-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (opining temporary, nighttime checkpoint stops too intrusive to innocent motorists).
91 See Prouse supra note 27.
92

d.

93 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 470 n. 12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan made a similar
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Court perceived that the only way for the government to successfully ful94
fill its worthwhile objective was to implement permanent roadblocks.
While the use of alcohol or drugs adversely affects
one's driving ability,
95
sneaking illegal aliens into the country does not.
Even as courts have accurately remarked on the importance of
various public safety concerns,9 6 they have sometimes given too much
weight to the government's contention that checkpoints are a necessary
tool of law enforcement. 97 Courts have also misconstrued the nature of the
injury to drivers and their passengers who must endure checkpoint detentions. 9 8 The crucial question is not the degree of intrusiveness, but the
type of intrusion the program imposes. 99 By failing to require that an officer have reasonable suspicion to stop a person in his or her vehicle, the
United States Supreme Court has opened the door to a far greater potential
for police abuse than previously existed.l °° While written guidelines en0 they cannot replace an individual's
hance the operation of any program, I1
1 02
constitutional right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures.
Although the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints for reasons of public safety, 10 3 it has rejected checkobservation, noting that the state in Sitz failed to show that identifying drunk drivers without checkpoints would constitute a formidable task, while adding that, in Martinez-Fuerte,
the government did demonstrate the difficulty of identifying illegal aliens merely by
watching cars drive by. Id. at 458 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
94Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 557 n. 12.
95See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 471-72 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (contrasting police officers'
ability to detect drunk drivers by nearby observation with their inability to so detect illegal
aliens).
9 See supra notes 2, 22.
97See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting alternative law enforcement means to fight drugs).
98See id (acknowledging seizure as "minimally intrusive" but asserting reasonableness hinges on existence of reasonable suspicion).
99See id. (insisting majority of Court wrongly focused on scope, rather than nature,
of intrusion).
100 See id. at 457. "By holding that no level of suspicion is necessary before the police may stop a car for the purpose of preventing drunken driving, the Court potentially
subjects the general public to arbitrary or harassing conduct by the police." Id
101 See supra Part III.
102 See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 578. "But to permit, as the Court does today,

police discretion to supplant objectivity of reason and, thereby, expediency to reign in the
place of order, is to undermine Fourth Amendment safeguards..." Id.
103
See supra note 2; see also Edmond, 183 F.3d at 664 (concluding checkpoints held
constitutional when safety primary purpose). Random checkpoints that courts have held
valid were not principally concerned with "catching crooks, but rather with securing the
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points designed to primarily interdict drugs.' ° Most courts that have assessed the constitutionality of drug enforcement checkpoints agree that the
purpose of such checkpoints relates more directly to law enforcement than
public safety. 105 Yet there is also a definite law enforcement component to
sobriety checkpoints because the government will very likely prosecute
those arrested for drunk driving. 1°6 By contrast, in Martinez-Fuerte, the
government simply deported most of the discovered illegal aliens rather
than prosecuting them.' 07
Courts tend to look at the specific stop, not at the overall program,
when evaluating the legality of a seizure that relates to general law enforcement. 0 8 To do otherwise threatens the Fourth Amendment rights of
all citizens who travel on the public roads.1 °9 The difficulty arises when
government
administrators
use pretextual
and
mixed-motive
checkpoints." 0 They may present a program under the guise of public
safety when, in fact, the program primarily aims to catch criminals and
uncover contraband." '1
Several courts have distinguished alcohol checkpoints from drug
checkpoints." 2 In so doing, courts have held the former constitutional and3
the latter not, usually based on a promotion of public safety analysis."1
Yet one could reasonably argue that drug checkpoints also further public
safety, although perhaps less directly and immediately. The Violence associated with drug trafficking is irrefutable. 1 4 However, the argument
safety or efficiency of the activity in which the people who are searched are engaged." Id
'o Edmond, 121 S.Ct. at 457-58.
105See supra note 33; see also Rodriguez, 2000 WL 29492, at *4 (finding drug

checkpoints' only purpose to promote "criminal justice goals").
106See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448 (remarking prosecution of drunk drivers caught
at
checkpoints routine).
107Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 553 n.9.
108 See Edmond, 183 F.3d at 662 (stating court's decision as to reasonableness
of seizures focuses on particular circumstances of case).
109See id. "[Tihe program approach might well permit deep inroads into privacy. In
high-crime areas of America's cities it might justify methods of policing that are associated
with totalitarian nations." Id.
110See supra notes 39-41.

1" See supra notes 39-42.
112See

Edmond, 183 F.3d at 664 (supporting "sobriety checkpoints" while rejecting

drug checkpoint where lacking true public safety goal); see also Rodriguez, 2000 WL
29492, at *4 (approving alcohol roadblocks while denouncing "drug interdiction roadblocks").
13 See supra notes 38-39.
14

See supra note 44.
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against allowing drug and alcohol checkpoints is that highly visible police
presence serves as an equally effective deterrent without invading the zone
of privacy to which every citizen lays claim."15
Law enforcement officials must ascertain the true purpose of a
checkpoint program to guide the courts in making a reasonableness determination. 116 Some circumstances so threaten the immediate safety of the
17
public that they justify a temporary intrusion into individuals' privacy."
Drunk drivers pose the threat of serious, imminent harm to the public,
which supports an argument in favor of alcohol checkpoints, yet the vigilant observation
by police out on the public roads obviates the need for
118
checkpoints.
The measure of effectiveness that the United States Supreme Court
and lower courts have indicated justifies a slight intrusion on individual
privacy rights is disturbingly low in those cases in which the motorists face
the threat of prosecution.11 9 A number of lower courts have cited the percentages from Martinez-Fuerte,120 despite the fact that the case involved a
strictly regulatory checkpoint program and the government simply deported most of the people that it caught.12 1 By setting such a low threshold, these courts have essentially written the effectiveness requirement out
of the Brown balancing test.122 Surely a relatively high effectiveness rate,
115See supra notes
116See

49-50.

supra notes 39-41.

117 See Edmond, 183 F.3d at 662-63 (giving examples of when "special needs"
exception would apply). The Seventh Circuit found four general exceptions to the prohibition
against suspicionless searches. Id. at 665. The four exceptions are: 1) when the police are
seeking a dangerous, fleeing felon; 2) when they have reason to believe a violent crime is
imminent by an unidentified source; 3) a regulatory search; and 4) a search to keep illegal
aliens from entering the country. Id at 665-66. Cf Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
164 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (supporting roadblocks to save life of person in imminent peril). Justice Jackson cited the example of a kidnapped child where the police set up
roadblocks in the vicinity and stop every car. He wrote:

[Ilt might be reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the
only way to save a threatened life and detect a vicious crime. But I should
not strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal search to salvage a
few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger. Id.
I18 See supra note 95.
119
See supra note 47.
120

See supra note 5 1.

121See Martinez-Fuerte,428
122See

U.S. at 553 n.9.

Sitz, 496 U.S. at 469 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing drunk driving check-

points yield arrest rate of only around one percent). Although the police made some arrests, Justice Stevens observed that there was no evidence to suggest that the checkpoint
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when that rate measures only the real purpose of the checkpoint, represents
strong, but23not conclusive, evidence of the need for a checkpoint or similar
program. 1
The abuses that can and do arise from police conduct at check24
points argue against their use except in exigent circumstances. 1 Permit_
ting regulatory roadblocks has led to some illogical findings, such as tentatively validating a roadblock if its main purpose is to check licenses and
registrations, while invalidating the same roadblock if its purpose is to rid
a neighborhood of an influx of drug trafficking. 125 Claiming the purported
need to ensure that only licensed drivers and registered vehicles travel the
roads has proved very successful in persuading courts to authorize checkpoints with a principal purpose of preventing drug dealing.126 Such mixedmotive checkpoints permit searches for evidence of crimes, absent the
requisite suspicion. 127
In Place, the Supreme Court held that a canine search of luggage is
not a search within the definition of the Fourth Amendment. 128 The Drug
Enforcement agents seized the luggage to conduct this "non-search" by a
trained dog only after they developed reasonable suspicion to believe the
bags contained contraband.129 The canine sniffs involved in drug and socalled safety inspection checkpoints are not the product of any individualized suspicion. 30 Ironically, if a dog at a roadblock indicates the presence
of illegal drugs in a seized car, that indication provides the grounds for
reasonable suspicion where none had previously existed. 13 ' Meanwhile,

resulted in any net gain to the public in removing drunk drivers from the road. Id. at 46970.
123 See supra notes 44-48.

124 See supra notes 63, 66, 79-80; see also Brouhard, 125 F.3d at 659 (refusing to
hold unconstitutional further detention of forty-one drivers with blood alcohol limits below
legal limit).
125 See Galberth, 590 A.2d at 999 (declaring checkpoint constitutional if main goal
to check licenses, unconstitutional if to find drugs).
126 See supra note 50.
127 See Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 557. "The problem with mixed-motive checkpoints is
that they allow law enforcement officers the opportunity to use a pretext to question and
search for contraband without probable cause, conduct the Supreme Court consistently has
frowned upon." Id.
...
See supra note 58-60.
129 Place, 462 U.S. at 698-99.
130See supra note 50.
131See supra note 50.
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the accuracy of these canine sniffs is highly questionable at times. 132
Without the use of the dogs, officers have only their senses and experience
on which to rely in looking for drugs. 133 Thus, the absence of trained narcotics dogs diminishes the effectiveness of the program. Nevertheless, the
canine sniff constitutes another minor intrusion, but one that impacts a
fundamental right, namely the right to be left alone. 134
While prohibiting alcohol and drug checkpoints makes the war
against these serious problems more difficult by inadvertently protecting
some criminals, the framers of the Constitution designed it to apply to all
citizens. 35 As Justice Scalia wrote in Arizona v. Hicks,136 "There is
nothing new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes
insulates the
' 137
criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all."
V. CONCLUSION
In theory, checkpoints aimed at the prevention of drunk driving and
drug trafficking have a strong appeal. The temptation to use them to rid
society of some enormous public safety hazards is almost irresistible.
Should not law-abiding citizens make the small sacrifice needed to allow
these checkpoints? The problem is that although the sacrifice may appear
small, it goes to the very heart of our freedom, the right to go out in public
free of fear that the police will harass us. "The imposition that seems diaphanous today may be intolerable tomorrow."'138 The public safety purpose that has helped to justify sobriety checkpoints seems capable of extension to other sorts of checkpoints, such as checkpoint to look for and
stop drivers in danger of falling asleep at the wheel.
No set of guidelines, no matter how thoroughly planned and
thoughtfully written, can change the fact that law enforcement officials are
people, many of them with their own set of biases and preconceived notions that color their actions, even those in their official capacity as public
132See id. (questioning accuracy of some canine sniffs).
133 See Rodriguez, 2000 WL 29492, at *1 (noting officer stuck his head through
car
window and smelled marijuana).
134 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (declaring "right
to be let alone ... right most valued by civilized men").
135 See Morales-Zamora,974 F.2d at 153. "Like the rains from heaven, constitutional
rights fall on the just and the unjust." Id.
136

480 U.S. 321 (1987).

...
Id. at 329.
138Sitz, 496 U.S. at 474 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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servants. Allowing law enforcement officers to stop people at checkpoints
with no reasonable suspicion grants those officers with strong prejudices
the power to intimidate and threaten citizens who have done no wrong.
Both the government and courts must attempt to minimize the number of
situations in which officers' zeal for enforcing the law and protecting the
public may overcome sound judgment. Law enforcement at all levels must
look for alternative means by which to confront the problems of drunk
driving and drug dealing. A more visible police presence in those areas
where these problems are severe, as well as community policing, could
yield favorable results.
It is reasonable for citizens to have an expectation of some degree
of privacy in their automobiles. In today's highly mobile society, people
are spending an increasing amount of time in their cars. They eat in them,
carry on personal conversations in them, sing in them and much more. In
a sense, the car has become an extension of the home. A car on the public
road is subject to regulation, but the car itself is not a public place.
In recent years, the Supreme Court of the United States has handed
down numerous decisions which have steadily eroded the Fourth Amendment rights of all citizens in the names of law enforcement, public safety
and minimal intrusions. The erosion shows little sign of abating. Despite
invalidating checkpoints with a primary purpose of drug interdiction, the
door is still open for law enforcement to operate checkpoints that include
drug interdiction as a secondary purpose. The Court's decision to postpone a determination as to the constitutionality of such multi-purpose
checkpoints poses a continual threat to a cornerstone amendment that has
supported some long-cherished freedoms. Reasonable suspicion already
sets a lower bar than does the constitutionally prescribed probable cause
standard. To require no suspicion before conducting a search and seizure
completely removes this bar. It could conceivably get to a point where
some Americans will be justifiably fearful of stepping out of their houses
because Big Brother is watching. This futuristic scenario is not as farfetched as it seems. One can lose one's freedoms in small, almost imperceptible increments just as easily as in one fell swoop. The results would
be equally devastating. States need to step in and accord their citizens the
protections that the federal government has chosen not to provide. The
reality of checkpoints to prevent drunk driving and drug trafficking is one
this nation must avoid in the names of liberty, justice and due process.
Theresa A. O'Loughlin

